I.1 “All of Gaul is divided into three parts” (Gallia...très)
Caesar suggests that Gaul will not unite against the Romans.

All these differ from one another in language, institutions, and laws
C. suggests that Gauls cannot not unite against the Romans.

Helvetians surpass the rest of the Gauls in valor (virtūte)
C. suggests that the Helvetians are a worthy opponent, that he as victor is more valorous, and that he will be able to defeat the less valorous Gauls

Helvetians contend in almost daily battles with the Germans
Caesar does not mention the Germans as a cause for the migration.

I.2: Orgetorix, attracted by desire of kingship, made a conspiracy
Caesar suggests that the Helvetian leader is motivated by self-interest to encourage the Helvetians to migrate into Gaul.

How does Caesar read minds and know Orgetorix’ motives?
How is Caesar aware of the secret conspiracy?

The Helvetians, greedy for warring, (bellandi cupidī) chose to migrate on account of overpopulation (prō multitūdine) and glory of war (glōriā bellī)
…Caesar suggests that the Helvetians are aggressive and that the reason for the migration is to expand Helvetian power in Gaul.

….Why doesn’t Caesar mention the constant threat of the Germans? (see I.1)

I.3: Sent by the Helvetians to strengthen ties (amicītiam confirmāre) with neighbors, Orgetorix persuades Casticus, the Sequanian, to seize the kingship (regnum...occupāre)
Likewise, Orgetorix persuades Dumnorix, the Aeduan, to attempt the same (ut idem conārētur) and marries his daughter to him.

…Caesar suggests Gauls such as the Sequanians and Aeduans may be opposed to the migration, but their leaders are motivated by self-interest to comply with Orgetorix’ plan. Later, Caesar will claim that Gallic opposition to the migration is one of the primary reasons for Caesar’s attack.

How is Caesar aware of this secret conspiracy?
Does Caesar have other evidence that the Gauls are opposed to the move?

I.4: Helvetians learn about this matter (ea res) and put Orgetorix on trial. If condemned, he is to be burned alive. Orgetorix, accompanied by 10,000, evades pleading his case and escapes. While the Helvetians gather troops, O. dies. The Helvetians judge that he killed himself (arbitrantur ipsum...interfecisse, I.4)
Caesar suggests that the Helvetians acknowledge that the leader of the migration effort was involved in a conspiracy and that Orgetorix committed suicide out of shame. The severity of the punishment suggests the severity of the crime Orgetorix committed.

Caesar does not tell what charge was made against Orgetorix. What is “ea res”?
Caesar adopts hearsay to suggest that Orgetorix killed himself.

I.5: Helvetians nonetheless (nihilō minus) do what they had decided
Caesar suggests that the Helvetians are hypocritical: they condemn the leader of the migration for promoting the migration for personal gain and then carry out the disgraced leader’s plan.

Caesar has no other evidence that the Gauls are opposed to the move?
I.6: There are two routes to Gaul: one route south through the Roman province at the city of Geneva; another west through the Iura mountains, so steep “that very few could easily stop (the Helvetians)” (ut facile perpauci prohibere possent). Caesar suggests that other Gauls, likely the Sequani, are hostile to the migration and would try to stop the Helvetians as they pass through the mountains. 

Helvetians thought that they would persuade the Allobroges (the Gauls inhabiting the Roman province) to let them pass or compel them by force (sē…persuāsūrōs (esse)…coactūrōs (esse))

Caesar suggests once again that the Helvetians are an aggressive, warlike people and that the Gauls in both the west and the south do not support the migration.

How is Caesar able to read the Helvetians’ minds and explain their motivations?

I.7: Caesar describes himself in the 3rd person: “Caesār cum id nuntiātum esset.” Caesar suggests that his account of the Helvetian campaign is objective and not just a another personal narrative of events.

The Helvetians request a meeting with Caesar and promise to pass through without any wrongdoing (maleficio). Caesar refuses when he recalls how L. Cassius was killed and his soldiers enslaved by the Helvetians.

Why is Caesar talking about a battle that occurred 50 years earlier? Is that battle relevant? Would the Romans consider it relevent? Is it true?

I.8: Caesar uses walls, ditches and one legion to repel the Helevetians from the 1st route through the Province and southern Gaul. The Helvetians are forced to travel on the second, northern route through the Iura mountains. 

The passage shows Caesar’s skill as a leader.

I.9: One route remains. The Aeduan Dumnorix, Orgetorix’ son-in-law, arranges that the Helvetians and Sequanians exchange hostages and that the Sequani allow Helvetians to pass.

Caesar suggests that the Sequanians are hostile to the Helvetian migration but that their leader is motivated by family ties to help the Helvetians. 

Perhaps we should not believe Caesar. Maybe the Sequani and other Gauls are not hostile to the Helevetian migration and the move is not creating the instability that Caesar will suggest as the reason for his intervention.

Dumnorix was “influenced by a desire of kingship” (adductī cupiditate regni, cf. Orgetorix’ motivation in I.2) to act on the Helvetians’ behalf.

Caesar suggests that Gallic leaders act out of self-interest and not the will of the people. 

How is Caesar able to read minds?

I.10: It was reported that the Helvetians have in mind to settle in the borders of the Santonii in southern Gaul, “not far (non longe) from the Tolosatii, which city is in the Province.”

Caesar suggests that the presence of the warlike Helvetians are an immediate threat to the stability in the Roman province.

According to the map, the Santonii and Tolosatii are roughly 250 miles from one another.
Caesar decides to attack.

I.12: After ¾ of the Helvetian copiae have crossed the Arar river, Caesar decides to attack the remaining ¼ on his side of the river. Caesar describes the ¾ as “troops” (copiae). He claims that that ¼ was the district Tigurīnus, which “in the memory of our fathers” (patrum...memoriā) killed the consul Cassius and enslaved his soldiers.

Caesar claims that it was either chance (cāsā) or plan of the gods (cōnsiliō deōrum) that he attacked this district first.

Caesar says that he avenged public and private injustice, because the grandfather of his father-in-law was killed during the attack on Cassius.

Caesar humanizes the Helvetians by describing them as “copiae.” Since the Helvetians try to hide in the woods, they are likely unarmed. Caesar suggests that his attack was both god-sent and justified vengeance.

Caesar says little about the human toll of the attack (90,000 people?) and much about his justification for the attack. It is misleading to claim that Cassius was killed in the memory of our fathers (50 years earlier!). Did Caesar truly avenge a private wrong?

I.21: While pursuing the remaining Helvetians from the rear, Caesar orders his legate Labienus to outflank the Helvetians with 2 legions on a nearby hill. Caesar sends P. Considius, an experienced soldier, as a scout.

Caesar builds Considius up as a credible source, so that when the information passed along by Considius proves unfruitful, Caesar can blame Considius.

I.22: Although Labienus reaches the appointed hill, and time is ripe for an attack, Considius tells Caesar that Helvetians not Labienus hold the hill, and Caesar does not attack. Caesar claims that Cassius terrified with fear (timore perterritum) reported what he had not seen as seen. Caesar suggests that someone other than himself is to blame for the failure of Caesar’s first attack.

Caesar seems willing to divert blame to maintain his image as a decisive leader.

1.23: With two days of grain left, Caesar stops his pursuit of the Helvetians and turns to Bibracte, 18 miles away, to acquire fresh supplies. Runaways (fugitīvīs) from Rome’s Gallic cavalry inform the Helvetians and the Helvetians pursue to cut of the Romans from their supplies.

Caesar suggests that he is a decisive leader, acting proactively to a problem. But, Caesar is to blame for not coordinating the movement of his troops with the grain supply.
I.24: Caesar settles on a nearby hill and prepares for an attack. He says that he filled the entire mountain above him (supra sē) with men.

Caesar’s use of short clauses, asyndeton, and numerous ablative absolutes make Caesar appear to be a swift and decisive leader. He notes that the men are above him on the hill as an indication that he is courageously facing the battle in the front with his men.

I.25: Caesar gives a vivid description of how the Romans use their pila to break the Helvetian phalanx. He describes how first he, then all the others removed their horses from sight (primum suō, deinde equī omnium...remōtīs)

I.26: The battle lasted for much of the day and into the night. C. suggests that Helvetians are a worthy enemy and Caesar is a worthy victor.

Only 130,000 people (homines) survive and try to escape during the night. Caesar does not state how many Romans were killed to minimize the affect of the losses on his victory.

I.27: The Helvetians surrender. (Slide is missing)

I.28: Caesar sends the Helvetians back to Helvetia to prevent the Germans from descending and becoming neighbors to the Roman Province.

Having minimized the role that the Germans played in the migration of the Helvetians, Caesar now portrays the Germans as aggressive in order to show how he acted in the best interest of the Romans.

I.29: Only now does Caesar include the number of Helvetians who migrated. From this evidence we can determine the number of unarmed Helvetians who were killed or missing.

368,000 migrate from Helvetian (I.29)
-130,000 survive (I.26)

238,000 dead or missing
-92,000 were able to bear arms (arma ferre, I.29)

146,000 unarmed Helvetians dead or missing